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Résumé: Nous proposons un modèle de vote stratégique dans lequel la décision de supporter ou non un 
candidat dépend de B, le bénéfice associé à l’élection de ce candidat, et de V, la viabilité 
perçue du candidat. Nous testons ce modèle sur des données obtenues lors d’une série 
d’expériences dans les quelles les participants votaient dans huit élections successives, quatre 
suivant la règle de vote à un seul tour, et quatre suivant le vote à deux tours. Nous montrons 
que le même modèle s’applique aux deux systèmes, bien que l’impact de la viabilité soit 
légèrement plus faible dans le cas des élections à deux tours. 
 
 
Abstract: We propose a model of strategic vote choice in which the decision to support or not to support 
a candidate depends on B, the benefit associated with the election of a given candidate, and V,
the candidate’s perceived viability. We test the model with data collected in a series of 
experiments in which the participants voted in eight successive elections, four under one 
round and four under two rounds. We show that the same model applies to both voting 
systems, though the impact of perceived viability is slightly weaker in two round elections. 
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Individual vote choice in an election depends on an interplay of factors: the options that 
the individual can choose from, the individual’s set of values and interests that induces 
her to prefer some options over others, the rules of the game, that is, what it takes for a 
candidate or a party to win, and the voter’s judgment about the various candidates’ 
chances of winning. The rules of the game are crucial, as they affect the supply of 
candidates as well as the strategic considerations that may induce voters not to vote for 
their preferred option because it is not perceived to be viable (Cox 1997). 
 
In this paper we propose a simple model of vote choice, in which the decision to support 
or not to support a candidate depends on two factors. The first factor is how much the 
voter likes the candidate: the more one likes a candidate, the greater the propensity to 
vote for that candidate. The second is the candidate’s viability, that is, the candidate’s 
chances of winning the election: the stronger the candidate’s viability, the greater the 
propensity to vote for that candidate. We test the model with an experiment in which the 
participants have to choose between five candidates.  
 
The model assumes that voters attempt to maximize their expected utility, which is based 
on a combination on a set of preferences and expectations about likely outcomes 
(Abramson et al. 2005). An individual rational choice model would require a full 
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specification of the value of the different potential outcomes as well as the subjective 
probability attached by the individual that the different actions at her disposal will result 
in different outcomes. Such models are usually not testable directly (but see Blais et al. 
2008). In this study we employ a more standard strategy (Alvarez and Nagler 2000; 
Bodet and Blais 2008), and we provide econometric estimates of the propensity to vote 
for a given candidate using a combination of B, the benefit that the voter would derive 
from the election of a given candidate, and V, which indicates the perceived viability of 
the candidate. 
 
Because voters are assumed to decide to vote on the basis of both B and V, we predict 
that some of them will vote strategically, that is, they will not vote for their first choice 
because they do not want to waste their vote on a candidate that has little or no chance of 
winning (Abramson et al. 2004, 1998; Alvarez and Nagler 2000; Black 1978; Blais and 
Nadeau 1996; Cain 1978; Evans and Heath 1993; Fisher 1973; Karp et al. 2002; Merolla 
and Stephenson 2007; Ordeshook and Zeng 1997). 
 
The benefit that a voter would derive from the election of a given candidate or party is 
typically measured through feeling thermometers which invite people to indicate on a 0 
to 100 scale how much they like or dislike the various parties or candidates (Abramson et 
al. 1992, 2004, 2007; Blais et al. 2001, 2006; Ordeshook and Zeng 1997). In the 
experimental setting we report here, the benefit is the financial gain associated with the 
election of a given candidate. 
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Viability refers to the voter’s perception as to whether a given candidate has a chance of 
winning. Some studies use the candidate’s actual vote support in the present or previous 
election as a proxy (Alvarez and Nagler 2000; Alvarez, Boehmke and Nagler 2006; 
Ordeshook and Zeng 1997), thereby assuming that voters are able to anticipate the 
outcome of an election or that they form their opinions on the basis of the previous 
election outcome (see Blais and Bodet 2006 for an assessment), while others rely on 
more direct questions about the perceived chances of winning, on a 0 to 10 or 100 scale 
(Abramson et al. 1992, 2004, 2007; Blais et al. 2000, 2006). 
 
In some analyses (Abramson et al. 1992, Ordeshook and Zeng 1997), the variable is used 
in its raw form, the prediction being that the propensity to vote for a candidate increases 
monotonously with her perceived chances. More recently Abramson et al. (2004, 2007) 
have used “folded” probabilities, on the basis that one should be most inclined to vote for 
candidates whom they like and who are uncertain to win (their chances are around 50 on 
the 0 to 100 scale). The underlying logic is that there is no value in voting for a candidate 
who is certain to win or to lose; the temptation to desert the preferred candidate is 
weakest when that candidate is involved in a close race (and one’s vote might make the 
difference). In another set of studies, a distinction is made between “viable” and 
“unviable” candidates, and what is deemed to matter is how distant one is from being 
viable (Alvarez and Nagler 2000; Alvarez, Boehme and Nagler 2006; Blais et al. 2000, 
2006). This approach has been applied to single-member district plurality elections, and it 
is based on the assumption that only the top two candidates are viable in such a system 
(Duverger 1951; Cox 1997). This approach, we would argue, is consistent with the 
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Duvergerian (or Coxian) perspective, according to which the voter’s task is to ascertain 
the candidate’s viability, and it is the one that we use in this study. 
 
The main purpose of the study is to show that the same basic model, according to which 
vote choice depends on a combination of voters’ preferences and their assessments of 
candidates’ viability, applies to both one round and two round elections.  
 
We examine two voting systems: one round plurality elections, whereby the candidate 
with the most votes wins, and two round majority runoff elections, whereby an absolute 
majority is required on the first ballot, and a second ballot between the top two 
contenders takes place if no candidate is elected on the first ballot, the candidate with the 
most votes on the second ballot being elected. These are the two most popular voting 
systems for the direct election of presidents in contemporary democracies (Blais, 
Massicotte and Dobrzynska 1997). 
 
The standard assumption in the literature is that the model proposed here, which asserts 
that vote choice does not merely reflect preferences because strategic considerations play 
an important role, applies to one round plurality elections. Indeed, the bulk of the studies 
cited above have shown the presence of strategic voting in such elections. These results 
are consistent with the predictions of Duverger (1951) and Cox (1997). 
 
Things are more complicated when it comes to other voting systems in general and two 
round elections in particular. The basic theoretical position is the Gibbard- Satterthwaite 
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theorem according to which no voting system is strategy-proof, and so the expectation is 
that assessments of viability should matter in any system. 
 
This is indeed the starting point adopted by Cox (1997) in his treatment of two-round 
elections. Cox takes issue with Duverger (1951), who implied that strategic 
considerations did not play a role in such systems. Cox asserts that judgments about 
viability matter as well in two round elections. The main difference, Cox argues, is that 
there are two “winners” in a two round system, that is, the top two candidates that 
become eligible for the final second round. Because there are two winners, M (district 
magnitude) equals 2, and there are three (M + 1) viable candidates in two round election, 
rather than two in one round elections. 
 
But Cox (1997, 137) also concedes that strategic considerations may play a weaker role 
in two round elections. The point is that more information is required to vote strategically 
in two round elections. In both types of elections, the voter has to determine whether the 
candidate is viable or not but in two round elections this entails trying to anticipate the 
possible outcomes of the first ballot and then the probable result of the second ballot 
under the possible runoff pairings. Cox concludes that because of this strategic voting is 
more complicated and probably less frequent. The logical prediction is that only the most 
sophisticated would make such calculations. 
 
There has been little empirical work on the extent of strategic voting in two round 
elections.1 Blais’ (2003, 2004) analysis of the 2002 French presidential election produced 
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some intriguing findings. On the one hand, Blais found little evidence of French voters 
deserting their first choice because that first choice was perceived to be unviable. On the 
other hand, there would seem to have been substantial “inverse” strategic voting, that is, 
people deserting their first choice because they were certain that their first choice would 
make it to the second round, in order to send policy signals to the candidates. More 
precisely, a number of French voters in the 2002 presidential election were more or less 
certain that the second round would be between Chirac and Jospin and decided to vote for 
another non viable candidate whose issue position they liked despite the fact that their 
preferred choice was one of the top two contenders, possibly in the hope that their 
preferred viable candidate would pay more attention to an issue advanced by the non 
viable candidate.  
 
Our objective is thus to test a simple model of “strategic” vote choice in which the 
decision to support or not to support a candidate depends on B, the benefit associated 
with the election of a given candidate, and V, the viability of the candidate. We wish to 
show that this simple model applies in two round as well as in one round elections, 
though viability is expected to have a slightly weaker impact in the former than in the 
latter, because of the greater complexity of the system. The model is tested with data 
collected in an experiment. 
 
The Experiment 
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The protocol is as follows. There are two groups of 21 voters. In each group, eight 
elections are held successively, four one round and four two rounds; one group starts with 
one round and the other with two rounds. In each election, there are five candidates, 
located at five distinct points on a left-right axis that goes from 0 to 20: an extreme left 
candidate, a moderate left, a centrist, a moderate right, and an extreme right (see Figure 
1). The set of options is identical in the two voting systems. 
 
For each of the four elections (under the same voting system), the participants are 
assigned a randomly drawn position on the 0 to 20 axis. There are a total of 21 positions, 
and each participant has a different position. The participants are informed about the 
distribution of positions. After the initial series of four elections, the group moves to the 
second set of four elections, held under a different rule, and the participants are assigned 
a new position. 
 
The participants are informed from the beginning that one of the eight elections will be 
randomly drawn as the « decisive » election. They are also told that they will be paid 20 
euros (or Canadian dollars) minus the distance between the elected candidate’s position 
and their own assigned position. For instance (this is the example given in the 
presentation), a voter whose assigned position is 11 will receive 10 euros if candidate A 
wins in the decisive election, 12 if E wins, 15 if B, 17 if D, and 19 if C. In the experiment 
(as in real life) it is in the voter’s interest that the elected candidate be as close as possible 
to her own position. When she casts her vote, the participant is asked to indicate how she 
rates, on a 0 to 10 scale, each of the candidate’s chances of winning the election.2 
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Four successive elections are held exactly in the same fashion under each of the two 
voting systems. Voting is secret.3 The outcome of each election (of each round in the case 
of two round elections) is announced publicly, providing the participants with 
information about the relative support given to the various candidates.  
 
We have performed six such experiments in Lille, Montreal, and Paris.4 The basic 
protocol was always the same but we introduced one variant. In two experiments, we had 
larger groups of voters, 63 rather than 21, to see whether the same patterns hold in larger 
groups.5 More precise information about each experiment is provided in Table 1. 
 
The best outcome, for each voter, the one that yields the highest reward, is the election of 
the candidate who is closest to her own position. But a voter may come to the conclusion 
that the closest candidate has no chance of winning and the contest is between the second 
closest candidate (her second choice) and the most distant (her worst option). The model 
proposed above assumes that the voter considers not only the benefits linked to the 
election of the various candidates but also their viability. 
 
The voter has to determine which candidates are viable and which ones are not. In our 
setup, if every voter were to vote sincerely for the candidate that is closest to her position, 
candidates A and E would each receive four votes, four voters have B as their closest 
candidate, four have D, and three have C; the last two voters (positions 8 and 12) are 
equally distant from C and B or from C and D. 
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The upshot is that candidates A and E cannot win if everyone votes sincerely. In one 
round elections, it takes at least five votes to win, while A and E receive only four votes 
each. C will win if and only if voters with positions 8 and 12 choose to vote for her 
(rather than for B or D, who is equally distant from their position). Otherwise B or D 
wins and if there is a tie between the two a random draw decides the winner. In all cases, 
A and E cannot win if everyone votes sincerely. The only viable candidates are B, C, and 
D. 
 
In two round elections, there will be a runoff between B and D if they each get five votes, 
between C and a random draw among the four others if C wins five votes (then all the 
others get four votes), or between B or D and a random draw among the four others (then 
B or D has five votes and all others have four). It is impossible (again assuming sincere 
voting) for both A and E to make it to the second round. It is possible for either one to 
make it to the second round but A or E cannot win on the second round because she will 
then face a non extremist candidate, whose position is bound to be closer to that of a 
majority of voters. Again, then, B, C, and D are the three viable candidates. 
 
All this assumes sincere voting. The same conclusion can be reached if we allow for 
strategic voting. In a plurality election, strategic voting entails deserting the weakest 
candidates in favour of a stronger second choice, and there seems to be no reason for any 
voter who is closest to B, C, or D, to move to A or E.   
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The same verdict applies in the case of two round elections. Strategic voting usually 
means deserting the weakest candidates in exactly the same way as in a one round 
plurality election. Theoretically there is the possibility of voting for the least favoured 
candidate in the first round if that ensures the victory of the most favoured candidate in 
the second round (Cox 1997, 129). But this would seem a very risky strategy (the 
favoured candidate may fail to get into the runoff) especially if, as is the case in our 
setup, no one candidate is guaranteed to make it to the second round.  
 
In both voting systems, therefore, candidates B, C, and D are viable, and candidates A 
and E are not. Indeed A and E failed to win any of the 96 elections held in the course of 
our experiments.  
 
Table 2 shows the total vote share obtained by the five candidates in all these elections.6 
We distinguish one round and two round elections on the one hand and small (n=21) and 
large (n=63) groups on the other hand. The prediction is that there will be strategic 
desertion of non viable candidates (A and E) in all cases but a little less in two round 
elections (because the system is somewhat more complicated) and in large groups 
(because the probability of being pivotal is lower). 
 
These predictions are mostly confirmed. In large groups, candidate A and candidate E 
obtain more votes (as anticipated) in two round elections but in small groups the pattern 
appears to be reversed. But what is most striking in Table 2 is how tiny the differences 
between the four groups are. The median difference in the vote share obtained by a given 
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candidate between paired groups is a mere two percentage points. Voting patterns in one 
round and two round elections are remarkably similar, and whether the electorate is made 
of 21 or 63 participants makes little difference. 
 
Table 3 indicates the mean perceived chance of winning of the various candidates in the 
four types of elections. We use standardized scores, where the rating given to a candidate 
is divided by the total ratings given to all five candidates, to facilitate comparability 
across individuals. It can be seen that the perceived chances of candidates B, C, and D are 
much higher than those of candidates A and E. More importantly, the mean scores given 
to each candidate are strikingly similar across types of elections and group size. 
 
A Model of Individual Vote Choice 
 
Our objective is to test an individual vote choice model in which the decision to support 
or not to support a candidate is assumed to hinge on benefits, B, and perceived viability, 
V. The benefit associated with the election of a candidate is 20 euros (or Canadian 
dollars) minus the distance between the position of that candidate and her own position. 
For instance, for a voter whose position is 11, the benefit linked to the election of 
candidates A, B, C, D and E is respectively 10, 15, 19, 17 and 12.7  
 
As indicated above, perceived viability, V, is tapped through a question asking 
participants to rate each candidate’s chance of winning the election. The top contender, 
with the highest chances, gets the maximum value of 1. For all the other candidates, the 
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value of V equals her standardized score divided by the standardized score of the top 
contender. V varies between 0 and 1.  
 
The expectation is that the propensity to vote for a candidate increases with the benefit 
associated with a candidate and with her perceived viability. We thus predict positive 
coefficients for both B and V.  This pattern should hold for one round and two round 
elections alike. But strategic considerations should play slightly less, and thus V should 
have a slightly weaker coefficient, in two round elections as well as in large electorates 
(because the probability of casting a decisive vote is smaller). 
 
The estimated conditional logit model is presented in Table 4. In each type of election, B 
and V have a positive and significant coefficient. As predicted also, V has a weaker 
coefficient in two rounds than in one round elections. Contrary to our prediction, 
however, the latter coefficient is not weaker in larger groups. Table 4 also shows that 
even controlling for B and V the participants were less prone to support extremist 
candidates A and E. Voters may have been tempted to avoid supporting extremist 
candidates when they were not sure how to vote. 
 
The previous estimations are based on an analysis that includes all the elections that took 
place in our six experiments. In each experiment, we hold four successive elections under 
one system (one round or two rounds), which were followed by a second set of four 
successive elections, with the other electoral system.  
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There is the possibility that the participants behaved differently in the second set of 
elections, because of what they had “learned” in the first set of elections (held under 
another voting rule). A stricter test would thus consist in restricting ourselves to the first 
set of elections and in comparing the determinants of vote choice under one round and 
two rounds in these first four “uncontaminated” elections.  
 
Table 5 shows the total vote share obtained by the candidates in the first set of elections. 
The pattern is very similar to that observed in the total sample (see Table 2).  
 
Table 6 presents our estimation of the impact of B and V. The patterns are very similar to 
those reported in Table 4. Each variable is statistically significant and with the expected 
sign for each type of election and each group size. Furthermore, we can see that, as in 
Table 4, V is only slightly less influential under two rounds than one round and that it is 
not weaker in larger groups. 
 
It could be argued that the appropriate theoretical model should be an interactive one, that 
is, voters should support only those parties that they both like and perceive to be viable 
(Ordeshook and Zeng 1997; Gschwend and Meffert 2007). We did test interactive models 
but the results were rather ambiguous. Statistically significant interactive effects emerged 
only in two of the four groups (small groups with one round elections and large groups 
with two round elections). Furthermore, the pseudo R2 were not increased (for small 
groups with one round elections, the interactive model had a R2 of .59 instead of .58 for 
the additive model; in the case of large groups with two round elections, the pseudo R2 
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remained at .57). These inconsistent results are similar to those reported by Alvarez and 
Nagler (2000) and Blais et al. (2001), who found no significant interaction effects. This 
could reflect the fact that our data, especially our measure of expectations, are not precise 
enough to capture such nuances, or it may indicate that voter behaviour does not quite 
correspond to the assumptions of the utility maximizing model. Voters may rely on a 
simpler heuristic approach, whereby they simply “take into account” both their 
preferences and their perceptions of viability in a satisficing way (see Blais et al. 2008, 
for a more extensive exploration of that hypothesis). We have thus decided to retain the 
simple additive model, which seems to work quite well for the data at hand.  
 
We have performed a number of simulations to illustrate the combined impact of B and 
V. The results of these simulations are presented in Tables 7 to 10. They indicate the 
predicted probability of voting for each candidate when B equals 0, 5, 10, 15, and 20 (B 
ranges from 1 to 20) and V equals 0, .5, and 1 (V ranges from 0 to 1). These figures show 
that the propensity to vote for a candidate increases substantially with increases in the 
gain associated with a given candidate and in her perceived viability. They also show that 
B matters more than V. For instance, the propensity to vote for a given candidate is close 
to nil when B is less than 10 even if the candidate is fully viable while the probability of 
voting for a candidate can reach 30% for a candidate who is strongly preferred (with a 
maximum B of 20) but who is perceived to be completely unviable (with a V value of 0). 
 
Tables 7 to 10 also illustrate that the differences between the voting systems and the large 
and small groups are relatively minor. The most “substantial” difference concerns those 
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with a strong preference for a candidate, those who with a B of 20. It can be seen that in 
one round elections the propensity to vote for candidates A or E increases from about 
10% when V equals 0 to close to about 60% when V equals 1; the equivalent percentages 
are respectively 10% and 50% in two round elections. Viability thus plays only slightly 
less in two round elections. Likewise, the likelihood of voting for candidates B, C, and D, 
is about 20% when they are perceived to be completely non viable in one round and 
elections and it increases to 80% when they are construed to be fully viable. The 
equivalent percentages in two round elections are 35% and 80%. Again the impact of 
viability is only slightly weaker in two round elections. 
  
These figures confirm that the temptation to desert unviable candidates is only slightly 
weaker in two rounds than in one round elections. The similarities between the two 
voting systems are much more important than the differences. 
 
It is also interesting to observe that the patterns are very much alike in small and large 
groups. We had expected that the propensity to desert unviable candidates would be 
stronger in smaller groups. We find no difference. This is reassuring. This suggests that 
the patterns that emerge in small group experiments can be generalized to middle size 
groups. 
 
Conclusion 
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The objective of this study was to show that the same simple model of strategic vote 
choice, in which the decision to vote or not to vote for a candidate depends on B, the gain 
associated with the election of a given candidate, and V, the perceived viability of that 
candidate, could be applied in two round as well as in one round elections. 
 
To that effect, we conducted a series of experiments in Lille, Montreal, and Paris in 
which groups of voters were invited to choose among five candidates in a series of one 
round and two round elections. We have shown that the vote shares of the various 
candidates were strikingly similar in one round and two round elections and that vote 
choice is similarly affected by B and V, though the impact of viability is, as expected, 
slightly weaker in two round elections. 
 
Our results conform to Cox’s prediction that strategic considerations come into play in 
two round elections as they do in one round contests. Cox speculates that strategic voting 
may somewhat less frequent in two round elections because the information required is 
somewhat more complex. Our findings indicate, however, that the differences between 
the two voting systems are quite small, which suggests that the information requirements 
do not vary much between the two systems. 
 
One may then wonder why there are so many parties and candidates in two round 
legislative and presidential elections, if voters appear almost as willing to desert unviable 
candidates as they are in one round elections. It is not possible to offer a fully satisfactory 
answer to this complex question, but a couple of important points must be made. 
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The first point is that the electoral system is only one of the factors that affect the number 
of parties in the legislature or candidates in a presidential election. As Neto and Cox 
(1997), have argued, party fractionalization also depends on sociological factors such as 
social heterogeneity. We would add that some attention should be paid to other aspects of 
electoral laws, such as public funding, which may facilitate or hinder the survival of 
small parties. 
 
The second point is that we have looked here only at the impact of the electoral system 
on voters’ behaviour. We have shown that when voters are offered the same set of viable 
and unviable options they make similar choices in the two systems and that these choices 
are based on the same considerations. 
 
But as a matter of fact, voters may be faced with more candidates in two round than in 
one round elections. And as a consequence, voter behaviour may vary across the two 
systems because the set of choices differs (see Blais and Loewen 2008, for a more 
extended discussion). 
 
This would have at least two implications. One is that we need to think about the 
incentives for parties or candidates to run or not to run in an election, or to make or not to 
make alliances, and to think about how these incentives may differ in the two voting 
systems. This means that we should think about experiments in which the participants (or 
some of them) are the parties rather than the voters (for an intriguing study along these 
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lines see Goodin and et al. 2008). The second is that we need to perform other 
experiments with fewer or more options, and/or with a different mix of viable and 
unviable candidates. It may be that voter behaviour varies between the two systems only 
under some conditions, that in some contexts, such as the one explored here, the patterns 
are very similar but that differences emerge in other situations. The impact of electoral 
systems on voters’ behaviour could well be, as are many other effects, conditional; there 
is an effect only in certain types of situation. 
 
Finally, a natural extension of the present study would be to perform experiments that 
include some elections held under proportional representation. The conventional wisdom 
used to be that there is little strategic voting under PR but recent empirical research 
suggests that this assumption must be revisited (see Blais et al. 2006; Gschwend 2007; 
Abramson et al. 2008). We need to conduct experiments that will allow us to compare the 
incentives to vote sincerely or strategically under PR, compared to plurality and majority 
systems. 
 
There is, however, one clear message that can be drawn from our research. Strategic 
voting does occur in two round elections. In both one round and two round elections, 
voters do not vote exclusively on the basis of their preferences, they also take into 
account the candidates’ chances of winning, and they are prone to desert those candidates 
that appear to be unviable. The propensity to vote strategically may be slightly weaker in 
two round elections, it may be more context dependent, but it exists.   
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TABLE 1: The Experiments 
Date Location Size First rule 
2006 December 11 Paris 21 1 
2006 December 11 Paris 21 2 
2006 December 13 Paris 21 1 
2006 December 13 Paris 21 2 
2006 December 18 Lille 21 1 
2006 December 18 Lille 21 2 
2006 December 18 Lille 63 1 
2006 December 18 Lille 63 2 
2007 February 20 Montreal 21 1 
2007 February 20 Montreal 21 2 
2007 February 22 Montreal 63 1 
2007 February 22 Montreal 63 2 
 
TABLE 2: Total Vote Percentage Obtained by the Candidates  
 
 ONE ROUND TWO ROUND 
 SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE
Can : A 7.5 4.0 6.9 6.8
Can : B 31.0 37.1 29.2 30.1
Can : C 24.4 29.7 27.9 27.2
Can : D 30.1 23.7 30.8 28.2
Can : E 7.0 5.5 5.2 7.6
  
N 668 995 671 995
NB: In the case of two round elections only the first round is considered. 
 
TABLE 3: Perceived Chances of Winning (mean score) 
 
 ONE ROUND TWO ROUND 
 SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE
Can : A .06 
(.08) 
.05 
(.08) 
.06
(.08)
.06
(.08)
Can : B .27 
(.14) 
.32 
(.12) 
.28
(.11)
.29
(.11)
Can : C .31 
(.16) 
.30 
(.16) 
.32
(.15)
.32
(.13)
Can : D .29 
(.13) 
.28 
(.16) 
.29
(.11)
.27
(.13)
Can : E .08 
(.11) 
.06 
(.08) 
.06
(.08)
.06
(.09)
   
N 659 995 665 986
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TABLE 4: A Conditional Logit Model of Vote Choice 
 
 ONE ROUND TWO ROUND 
 SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE 
Gain .45*** 
(.03) 
.55*** 
(.03) 
.46*** 
(.03) 
.52*** 
(.02) 
     
Viability 3.53*** 
(.27) 
3.86*** 
(.25) 
2.35*** 
(.23) 
2.40*** 
(.20) 
     
Can : A .16 
(.30) 
.-1.33*** 
(.28) 
-1.11*** 
(.28) 
-1.21*** 
(.25) 
Can : B .39* 
(.16) 
.12 
(.12) 
-.04 
(.15) 
-.04 
(.13) 
Can : D .28 
(.16) 
-.82*** 
(.15) 
-.13 
(.14) 
-.07 
(.13) 
Can : E -.52 
(.29) 
-1.36*** 
(.29) 
-1.49*** 
(.30) 
-1.13*** 
(.24) 
     
Pseudo R2 .58 .63 .54 .57 
N 655 986 664 977 
 
*: Significant at .05; **: Significant at .01; ***: Significant at .001. 
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TABLE 5: Total Vote Percentage Obtained by the Candidates (First Set of 
Elections) 
 
 ONE ROUND TWO ROUND 
 SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE
Can : A 7.5 4.8 6.0 7.1
Can : B 29.1 35.3 28.3 30.5
Can : C 27.3 36.9 33.6 24.2
Can : D 24.9 15.5 27.8 29.1
Can : E 9.9 6.7 4.5 7.7
  
N 333 496 336 508
  
TABLE 6: A Conditional Logit Model of Vote Choice (First Set of Elections) 
 
 ONE ROUND TWO ROUND 
 SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE 
Gain .36*** 
(.03) 
.52*** 
(.04) 
.43*** 
(.04) 
.58*** 
(.04) 
     
Viability 3.15*** 
(.34) 
3.42*** 
(.36) 
2.62*** 
(.38) 
2.73*** 
(.29) 
     
Can : A -.10 
(.35) 
-1.35*** 
(.36) 
-.90* 
(.43) 
-1.17** 
(.38) 
Can : B .26 
(.20) 
.16 
(.16) 
.19 
(.22) 
-.09 
(.19) 
Can : D .15 
(.20) 
-1.09*** 
(.21) 
.00 
(.21) 
.07 
(.19) 
Can : E -.07 
(.34) 
-1.56*** 
(.40) 
-1.48*** 
(.46) 
-1.12*** 
(.33) 
     
Pseudo R2 .49 .57 .51 .61 
N 325 490 334 487 
 
 
*: Significant at .05; **: Significant at .01; ***: Significant at .001. 
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Table 7 : Estimated Probabilities of Voting for a Candidate Depending on the 
Values of B and Viability (One Round, Small Group) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 2 12 
0.5 0 0 1 8 37 
1.0 0 1 5 28 72 A 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 4 21 
0.5 0 0 2 15 52 
1.0 0 1 10 42 82 B 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 2 13 
0.5 0 0 1 9 40 
1.0 0 1 6 30 75 C 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 3 20 
0.5 0 0 2 14 49 
1.0 0 1 10 40 80 D 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 1 7 
0.5 0 0 1 5 25 
1.0 0 0 3 18 59 E 
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Table 8 : Estimated Probabilities of Voting for a Candidate Depending on the 
Values of B and Viability (One Round, Large Group) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 0 6 
0.5 0 0 0 3 24 
1.0 0 0 1 14 56 A 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 4 30 
0.5 0 0 2 19 62 
1.0 0 1 11 48 88 B 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 3 22 
0.5 0 0 1 13 55 
1.0 0 1 7 40 85 C 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 2 15 
0.5 0 0 1 9 39 
1.0 0 0 5 28 70 D 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 1 6 
0.5 0 0 0 3 24 
1.0 0 0 2 15 56 E 
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Table 9 : Estimated Probabilities of Voting for a Candidate Depending on the 
Values of B and Viability (Two Round, Small Group) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 2 13 
0.5 0 0 1 5 28 
1.0 0 0 2 13 51 A 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 1 7 35 
0.5 0 0 2 17 58 
1.0 0 1 7 35 78 B 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 1 6 33 
0.5 0 0 2 15 57 
1.0 0 1 6 33 79 C 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 1 7 34 
0.5 0 0 2 17 56 
1.0 0 1 7 35 77 D 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 1 9 
0.5 0 0 0 3 22 
1.0 0 0 1 10 42 E 
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Table 10 : Estimated Probabilities of Voting for a Candidate Depending on the 
Values of B and Viability (Two Round, Large Group) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 1 13 
0.5 0 0 0 4 28 
1.0 0 0 1 11 51 A 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 1 6 37 
0.5 0 0 2 16 60 
1.0 0 0 5 33 80 B 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 4 34 
0.5 0 0 1 13 59 
1.0 0 0 4 30 81 C 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 5 35 
0.5 0 0 1 15 58 
1.0 0 0 4 32 79 D 
       
Viability\ B 0 5 10 15 20 Candidate 
0 0 0 0 1 14 
0.5 0 0 0 4 30 
1.0 0 0 1 12 52 E 
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Figure 1: Positions of the Candidates on the Left/Right Axis 
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NOTES 
 
 
                                                 
1 Abramson et al. (2004, 2007) examine the 1999 Israeli Prime Ministerial election which was technically a 
two round election but they treat it as a single round election because it was decided on the first ballot and 
all but two candidates had withdrawn by election day. 
2 For two round elections, participants were asked to indicate, on the first ballot, the candidates’ chances of 
making it to the second round, and, on the second round, the chances of winning the election. We use the 
former in our analyses.  
3 It was possible to leave a blank ballot but very few participants did so. There were 23 blank ballots in the 
experiments reported here, that is, 0.69% of total ballots. 
4 We also performed four experiments in which the candidates’ perceived chances were not tapped. For an 
overview of the findings see Blais et al. (2007).  
5 In one of the “large group” experiments, a mistake occurred, and the number of participants in the two 
sessions held in adjacent rooms was 61 and 64. This has no practical effect on the findings.  
6 Note that in the case of two round elections we consider only vote choice in the first round throughout the 
paper. 
7 It could be argued that the expected benefit is one eight of those numbers because there are eight elections 
and only one (randomly chosen) counts. We keep undivided numbers for sake of simplicity.  
